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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[June

WILLS AND DECEDENTS' ESTATES
Probate
NECESSITY OF PROBATE

It is a basic and general rule that a person cannot assert any right in
a court of equity or law under a will which has not been probated. Therefore, in an action by a plaintiff to set aside a deed to land to which plaintiff claimed title under an unprobated will, the common pleas court in
St'awder v. Smith' properly sustained the defendant's demurrer.
NOTICE TO RESIDENT HEIRS

In the case of Vance v. ByerlyY after testatrix' death in 1955, one of
the heirs promptly presented testatrix' will for probate and notified all
other heirs but one. The heir not notified was the adopted daughter of
testatrix' deceased son. Apparently, no notice of probate was given to
her because the personal representative's counsel believed that the amendments to the Ohio Code which authorized inheritance by an adopted
child through his adoptive parents did not apply to a child adopted prior
to the amendment. 3 Consequently, the person who applied for probate
knew that the adopted daughter was a resident of Ohio, but apparently
did not consider her an heir.4 This adopted daughter died in June, 1955,
three months after the will was probated. In September, 1956, the surviving husband of the adopted daughter instituted an action in equity in
the common pleas court to have the probate of testatrix' will vacated.
The defendant pleaded estoppel and laches but defendant's pleas could
not be sustained on the facts. The common pleas court sustained plaintiff's demurrer to defendant's pleas, and vacated the probate of testatrix'
will.
NATURE OF PROBATE

Although Section 2107.13 of the Ohio Revised Code requires the applicant for probate to give notice to the surviving spouse and to all heirs
known by the applicant to be Ohio residents, the probate proceeding is
basically ex parte. Therefore, only the applicant may present evidence.
'75 Ohio L. Abs. 186, 143 N.E.2d 327 (C.P. 1957).
'76 Ohio L. Abs. 72, 140 N.E.2d 912 (C.P. 1957).
'Probate in Vance v. Byerly occurred prior to In re Estate of Millward, 166 Ohio St.
243, 141 N.E.2d 462 (1957) in which the court rejected the argument that the law
in effect at time of adoption controlled the right of natural relatives to inherit from
adopted person.
'Vance v. Byerly, 76 Ohio L Abs. 72, 140 N.E.2d 912 (CP. 1957).
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Persons opposed to probate may cross examine the subscribing witnesses
and proponent's other witnesses. 5
By a four-to-three decision, the Ohio Supreme Court held in the case
of In Re Estate of Lyons 6 that the probate court has no statutory authority to determine the fact that a document offered for probate was or was
not properly executed. In the Lyons case, there was a full attestation
clause and all three subscribing witnesses admitted subscribing their
names. However, two of the subscribing witnesses testified that at the
time they subscribed testator had not signed and that testator never
signed nor acknowledged his signature in their presence. The third sub.
scribing witness contradicted the other two. He testified that the testator declared the document to be his will, signed each page on the left
margin, and signed the last page at the end in the presence of the three subscribing witnesses. The probate court believed the two subscribing witnesses who testified against the will and denied probate. The court of
appeals affirmed this judgment of the probate court. But the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed because the probate court had -before it substantid evidenee from which reasonable minds could have concluded that
the will was properly executed.
Will Contest
NECESSARY PARTIES
Section 2741.02 of the Ohio Revised Code specifically provides that
the executor or administrator is a necessary party to a will contest. There
is some question as to the desirability of a strict construction of this statutory requirement.& However, the Ohio Supreme Court in a four-to-three
decision in Mangan v. Hopkins,8 prevented the contesting of a will because in the caption of the petition the name of the person who was the
administrator with the will annexed appeared without any indication that
he was a party in a representative capacity. In the body of the petition,
this person was properly designated as the administrator but the precipe
was issued and summons served upon him in his individual capacity only.
The administrator was not, as in two Ohio Supreme Court cases decided
r Io re Will of Elvin, 146 Ohio St. 448, 66 N.E.2d 629 (1946).
Iore Estate of Lyons, 166 Ohio St. 207, 141 N.E.2d 151 (1957).
S"I am of opinion that the Peters and Bynner cases went to the extreme limit in the
application of the statute, and that the application should not be extended beyond that
limit." See Judge Stewart, dissenting in Mangan v. Hopkins, 166 Ohio St. 41, 44,
138 N.E.2d 872, 873 (1956). Mr. Judge Taft, concurring in Mangan v. Hopkins,
166 Ohio St. 41, 42, 138 N.E.2d 872 (1956).
'Mangan v. Hopkins, 166 Ohio St. 41, 138 N.E.2d 872 (1956).
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in 1950,9 an heir or a beneficiary under the will. For this reason, the
dissenters believed these 1950 cases were distinguishable. They felt that
the extension of the technical rule, established in 1950, to a situation
where the personal representative was neither an heir nor a beneficiary
under the will was an "unjustifiable technicality resulting in an unnecessary barrier in the path toward justice."
The recent case of Abbott v. Dawson"° apparently marks a point beyond which the Ohio Supreme Court will not go in the application of
technical rules of procedure which bar will contests. In the Dawson case,
the executor was named in his representative capacity in both the caption
and the body of the contestant's petition. The executor had no other relation to decedent's estate than as personal representative. For these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and the common pleas court and held that the executor, as such, was a party to the
will contest, though the precipe for service of summons named him only
as an individual. The case of Mangan v. Hopkins was distinguished because in that case the administrator with the will annexed was named
only as an individual in the caption of the contestant's petition.
The Ohio Supreme Court in Andes v. Shippe"l refused to allow a contestant as plaintiff to dismiss a will contest to the prejudice of another
contestant who had been joined as a defendant. Consequently, a common
pleas court improperly refused to allow a plaintiff contestant to make an
heir a party defendant after the common pleas court permitted this heir
to withdraw as a plaintiff long after the expiration of the period for contest. Having refused to allow this heir to be made a party defendant, the
common pleas court then dismissed the will contest for want of all necessary parties. Since other heirs were defendants, and the heir who was
to be added as a defendant had been one of the plaintiffs, there was no
bar to adding an additional heir as defendant.' 2 The common pleas decision was reversed by the court of appeals."
'Peters v. Moore, 154 Ohio St. 177, 93 N.E.2d 683 (1950); Bynner v. Jones, 154
Ohio St. 184, 93 N.E.2d 687 (1950).
10 167 Ohio St. 238, 147 N.E.2d 609 (1958).
u 165 Ohio St. 275, 135 N.E.2d 396 (1956).
"Gravier v. Gluth, 163 Ohio St. 232, 126 N.E.2d 332 (1955); Cover v. Hildebran,
103 Ohio App. 413, 145 N.E.2d 850 (1957); Carnicom v. Murphy, 101 Ohio App.
416, 140 N.E.2d 3 (1956). But cf. Fletcher v. First National Bank, 167 Ohio St.
211, 147 N.E.2d 621 (1958); (a cousin and heir of decedent who was not named a
defendant nor made a party by publication cannot be added as a defendant after expiration of six month period though other cousins who were heirs were named and
served as defendants within this period.)
'Frederick v. Brown, 102 Ohio App. 117, 141 N.E.2d 683 (1956).
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DIRECTED VERDicr FOR PROPONENT

In an action to set aside a will because of undue influence, the risk
of non-persuasion is on the contestant to prove undue influence. If the
contestant fails to introduce substantial evidence from which reasonable
men might find undue influence, the judge may direct a verdict for the
proponent.'
In Mohr v. Korte,15 a majority of the court of appeals
found no error in the direction of a verdict for proponent by a common
pleas judge. The dissenter construed the testimony of contestant's witness in such a way that the jury might have found that testatrix' daughter
told testatrix that a trust fund had been established for a certain grandson
when in fact there was no trust fund. The majority construed this testimony as relating solely to a conversation between testatrix' daughter and
the mother of the grandson. The daughter who was alleged to have exerted undue influence would have received as her intestate share the same
share in her mother's estate as she received under the will.
DisMIssAL FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION

If an action to set aside a will is properly instituted with service on
all necessary parties and then is dropped by the court for want of prosecution, the case must be reinstated upon motion of plaintiff's counsel who
were not notified before the case was dropped. Plaintiff's counsel were
not notified because their names were not substituted as counsel after the
death of plaintiff's original counsel who instituted the action. The common pleas court had failed to prepare the issue whether the writing produced at probate was the last will or codicial of testator. Under section
2741.04 of the Revised Code it is the duty of the court to make up this
issue by a proper journal entry. Therefore, the plaintiff should not be
penalized for the failure of the court to perform its duty.'1
Rights of Surviving Spouse
ELECrION BY NONRESIDENT
Testatrix and her husband were American citizens domiciled in Bermuda. Testatrix owned personal property worth about $127,000 with
its situs in Hamilton County, Ohio. Testatrix' will was probated only in
Hamilton County. Testatrix' husband elected to take against the will.
The executor opposed this election on the ground that the testatrix and
her husband were domiciled in Bermuda and that under the laws of Bermuda, the surviving spouse has no right of election. The probate court
12 PAGE, WILLS 5 659, 661, (3d ed. 1941).
143 N.E.2d 636 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
Sharp v. Johnson, 103 Ohio App. 194, 144 N.E.2d 896 (1957).
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held and the court of appeals affirmed in the case of In re Estate of
Godd17 that since the will was originally probated in Ohio where the
personalty was located, the surviving spouse had the right to elect to
take against the will. Section 2107.39 of the Ohio Revised Code does
not exclude a non-resident surviving spouse from electing to take against
the will.
PURCHASE OF MANSION

HOUSE

18

In the case of In re Estate of Fouts, the intestate at her death owned
an undivided one-fourth interest in a farm of 360 acres. This undivided
interest was appraised at $13,500. The surviving spouse elected to buy
this undivided interest at its appraised value under Section 2113.38 of
the Ohio Revised Code. The probate court authorized the sale, but provided that the surviving spouse must pay to intestate's heirs one-fourth
of any money subsequently received from the state of Ohio for a right
of way. The court of appeals modified the order of the probate court
because at intestate's death no one knew that a portion of the farm would
be used as a highway. Having eliminated the claim of the heirs to a portion of the money to be paid for the right of way, and considering the
appraised value as of intestate's death, the court of appeals found that
the appraised value was neither so inadequate as to unconscionably prejudice the heirs nor the result of fraud.
The other issues in the case of In Re Estate of Fouts are discussed
under the Administration section of this article.
The court of appeals in the case of In Re Estate of Clark 9 properly
held that the right of the surviving spouse to buy the mansion house indudes an entire farm consisting of three tracts of about 7, 28, and 65
acres but which were farmed as a unit. All buildings, except several old
buildings used for storage, were located on the smallest of the three
tracts.
Administration
The Ohio Revised Code in Section 2505.02 provides for review of
"an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding." It
is difficult, therefore, to understand the decision of the majority of a
court of appeals that an order of a probate court authorizing the presentation of a claim against a decedent's estate after the expiration of the
four month period and pursuant to Section 2117.07 is not an appealable
order. The Ohio Supreme Court properly reversed the court of appeals
' 75 Ohio L. Abs. 298, 140 N.E.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1956).
" 103 Ohio App. 313, 145 N.E.2d 440 (1957).

1102

Ohio App. 200, 141 N.E.2d 890 (1956).
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in the case of Ia Re Estate of Wyckoff, 20 thereby protecting the estates
of decedents against improper authorizations by probate courts for the
filing of claims after the expiration of the four month period.
In the case of In Re Estate of Fouts,21 claims were submitted by an
insurance company and a bank to intestate's administrator on two promissory notes which had been signed jointly by intestate and her husband.
The husband is also intestates administrator. The probate court disallowed these two claims because the one by the insurance company represented money borrowed to pay for the husband's undivided three-fourth
interest in land; and the claim by the bank was for money borrowed by
the husband to 'buy personalty. The court of appeals reversed this order
of the probate court because under Section 2117.31 of the Ohio Revised
Code the insurance company and the bank had the right to demand payment from the intestate wife's estate. Since the husband was the primary debtor and the administrator of his wife's estate, if the two claims
were paid from the assets of his wife's estate, th6 court held that he as
administrator had to be surcharged.
In the case of In Re Estate of Bowman,22 the court of appeals sustained a claim for $3,125 by a daughter-in-law for caring for her aged
father-in-law in her home. The court of appeals determined that there
was no family relationship between claimant and her father-in-law.
When the person rendering the services and the one receiving it are
both members of a family whether or not related by blood, there is a
presumption that the services were rendered gratuitously. A family relationship exists when there is reciprocity or mutuality of benefits.
Claimant in the Bowman case received neither money nor service from
intestate prior to his death.
Upon motion of a claimant made within one year of the order settling
the account of the administratrices, a probate court in the case of In Re
Estate of Douglass2 8 reopened the account. Claimant had filed his claim
for $130.50 within -the statutory period. The attorney for the administratrices had written claimant that the intestate was never satisfied with claimanes work and therefore the attorney would recommend payment of only
$50 to claimant. The Schedule of Claims thereafter filed ,by the administratrices indicated that this claim had been rejected as of the date of the
attorney's letter. Section 2117.11 of the Ohio Revised Code requires the
personal representative to give the claimant written notice of rejection.
Under this section, if the claimant in writing demands allowance of his
166 Ohio St.354, 142 N.E.2d 660 (1957).
'103 Ohio App. 313, 145 NE.2d 440 (1957).
" 102 Ohio App. 121, 141 N.E.2d 499 (1956).
' 144 N.E.2d 924 (Ohio Prob. 1957).
'
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claim within five days, the claim is rejected if the personal representative
fails to give claimant within five days a written notice of the acceptance
of his claim. Since there is no duty on claimant to demand an allowance, claimant was not prejudiced in the Douglass case by his failure to
make such a demand. The probate court held that -the attorney's letter
was not an unequivocal rejection of the claim.
Section 2117.07 of the Ohio Revised Code provides that the probate
court may authorize the presentation of a claim to the executor or administrator after the expiration of the period of the non-claim statute if
the -probate court finds "that the claimant did not have actual notice of
the decedents death or of the appointment of the executor or administrator in sufficient time to present his claim within the period -prescribed
4
by section 2117.06 of the Revised Code." The Ohio Supreme Court
has held that the word "or" in the phrase, "did not -have actual notice of
the decedents death or of the appointment of the executor or administrator" does not mean "and." However, the Ohio Supreme Court has also
stated that a claimant who knows of his debtor's death is "at once put
upon inquiry as to the appointment of a fiduciary and if he learns of
such appointment, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence could learn
of -the same, he must file his claim within the specified four-month
period ....25 In the case of InRe Estate of Lathrop,26 the court of appeals reversed the judgment of a probate court. The -probate court had
sustained demurrers to claimants' petitions and -had refused to authorize the
filing of claims after the four-month period because claimants knew of
decedents death shortly after it occurred and knew decedents post
office address. Claimants did not learn of the appointment of an executor until five months after his appointment. The issue which should
have been considered by the probate court as stated by the court of
appeals is whether under all the facts the claimants exercised reasonable
diligence to learn of the appointment of the executor.
Claimants and decedent in the Lathrop case were involved in an automobile accident August 8, 1954, in Van Wert County. Decedent prior to
his death was moved from the Van Wert County Hospital to a hospital in
Lima, Ohio, which is in Allen County. Decedent died August 10, 1954,
in this hospital. Newspaper articles in the Lima News on August 9, 10,
and 11, 1954, gave decedent's address as Route 1, Lima, Ohio. Claimant
employed an attorney in Lima who examined the records of the probate
court of Allen County on October 18, 1954, and on January 28, 1955.
On this latter date, the attorney learned from his employee that Route 1
"In re Estate of Marrs, 158 Ohio St. 95, 107 N.E.2d 148 (1952).
"Id. at 100, 107 N.E.2d at 151.
103 Ohio App. 392, 141 N.E.2d 212 (1956).
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out of Lima might include part of Auglaize County. The attorney immediately telephoned the probate court of Auglaize County and learned
that an executor had been appointed for decedents estate more than five
months earlier. The court of appeals held that knowledge of decedent's
death, and of decedents post office address is not the same as knowledge
of decedents residence. For this reason, it reversed the probate court
which had sustained demurrers to claimants' petitions.
A tort claim for injuries which were received in an accident between'
an automobile in which claimant was a passenger and an automobile driven
by decedent is not a contingent claim which may be filed after the expiration of the four month period. Therefore, it is immaterial according
to Lewis v. Knight 27 that the specific injury for which recovery is sought
was not known -toexist until after the expiration of the period for filing
claims against decedents estate.
A person who pays a note secured 'by a mortgage does not -have to file
a statement of payment within the four month period because there is
no debt. Consequently, when in Fox v. McCreary28 the mortgagees administrator sued the mortgagor to foreclose the mortgage, the failure of
the mortgagor to file a "claim" of payment was no bar to proving payment of the note which was secured by .the mortgage.
Revocation By Operation of Law
The Ohio Revised Code in Section 2107.33 provides in general language that "this section does not prevent the revocation implied by law,
from subsequent changes in the circumstances of the testator." This general language introduces into the Ohio law of wills an undersirable uncertainty. Revocation 'by change in circumstances should be allowed only
on the grounds specifically set forth in the statute. For example, Section
53 of the Model Probate Code provides as follows:
If after making a will the testator is divorced, all provisions in the will
in favor of the testator's spouse so divorced are thereby revoked. With this

exception, no written will, nor any part thereof, can be revoked by any
change in the circumstances or condition of the testator.

Under this section of the Model Probate Code, the will in Lang v. Leiter,9
would have been revoked by testator's divorce.
The testator in 1936 married the -person from whom he was divorced
in 1953. The divorce was granted testator's wife because of his gross
neglect of duty. Testator executed his will in 1948 in which he left all
75 Ohio L Abs. 589, 144 N.E.2d 551 (Ct App. 1955).
, 103 Ohio App. 73, 144 N.E.2d 546 (1957).
103 Ohio App. 119, 144 N.E.2d 332 (1956).
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of his property to "my wife, Lucille M. Leiter" if she survived him. If
she did not survive testator, -then his property was to go to a niece and
nephew. After the divorce in 1953, testator's former wife remarried.
Testator died in 1954. There was no separate and full property settlement
by testator and his -former wife before, at the time of, nor after the divorce. However, the probate court held that the divorce revoked the
will by operation of law. The court of appeals reversed the probate court
because of the absence of a full property settlement, such as was made by
the testator in Younker v. Johnson"° where the divorce and the full property settlement together constituted a sufficient change of circumstances
to revoke testator's will which was executed during the period of his marriage.
Consfruction
In the case of Partridgev. Pidgeon,81 the Ohio Supreme Court had before it a contract for the disposition of testator's interests in two partnerships and also testator's will. The cbntract and will had been construed
initially 'by a probate court in a declaratory judgment action. The contract
for the disposition of the interests in 'the partnerships is considered in another portion of this annual survey aa Therefore, only the will of one of
the partners will be considered by the writer.
At testator's death, he owned a fifty percent interest in one partnership and a thirty-five percent interest in another partnership. Testator
purported to bequeath to his -two sons all his interest in the assets of the
two partnerships. Testator also provided in his will that if the contract
for the sale of his partnership interests should not 'be carried out and if
the 'bequest of the testator's interests in the two partnerships should not
be effective, then his two sons should have the right to 'buy his interests in
the partnerships. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the sons received
the testator's interests in the partnerships subject to the right of the other
partners to purchase them under the contract and that this specific bequest
necessarily carried with it profits earned prior to -testator's death but unpaid and profits from testator's death to the sale of the interests in the
partnerships. Upon sale of the interests, the sons were entitled to the
proceeds. Thus, there was no ademption and also the portion of the
partnership profits payable to testator's estate did not pass under the
residuary clause.
The probate court in Bartels v. Bartelrs3 through the use of extrinsic
' 160 Ohio St. 409, 116 N.E.2d 715 (1954).
' 166 Ohio St. 496, 143 N.E.2d 840 (1957).

'See p. 352 supra.
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evidence was able to arrive at a reasonable judicially ascertained intent as
to the persons to whom testatrix intended to give legacies. Through inadvertence in drafting and the failure of testatrix to carefully read the will
before signing it the testatrix's will inaccurately described a number of the
beneficiaries and their relationship to her.

Joint Bank Accounts
In Bartels v. Bartels and the case of In re Schroeder,3 5 probate courts
, 34

held that as to money in a joint bank account with no provision for survivorship, upon the death of one of the joint depositors, his estate is entided to half of the money on deposit. Only the half payable to the
estate of the deceased joint depositor is subject to the Ohio inheritance
tax. It is interesting that it was also held in the Schroeder case that when
the joint account provided for payment of any balance to the survivor, the
entire balance was presumed to be taxable as property of the deceased joint
tenant except to the extent -the survivor could prove the contrary. Under
Section 5731.02 of the Ohio Revised Code as to decedents who die on or
after June 17, 1957, joint accounts in the name of husband and wife are
taxable at one-half the balance in -the account at the death of one without
regard to their contributions.

Descent and Distribution
The probate court, court of appeals, and Ohio Supreme Court all properly held in the case of It re Estate of Millward36 that there are no vested
rights in an inheritance and therefore under the Ohio statute in force at
an intestate's death, a natural son of an intestate cannot inherit from his
natural father if the son 'has been adopted by another. The purpose of
the statutes which make adopted children able to inherit from and through
their adoptive parents and not from or through their natural parents is
to increase the family solidarity of the adoptive parents, the adopted child,
and any natural children of the adoptive parents. This policy is somewhat in conflict with custom and with the common law emphasis on inheritance by blood relationship, but the new policy is basically sound.
Natural parents and 'blood relatives of persons who have been adopted
should be stimulated by decisions of this type to will property to these persons if they desire the adopted persons to receive a portion of their estate
at death. For the same reason, persons who 'have been adopted should -be
75 Ohio L. Abs. 117, 139 N.E.2d 695 (Prob. 1956).

84Ibid.

m75 Ohio L. Abs. 555, 144 N.E.2d 512 (Prob. 1957).
166 Ohio St. 243, 141 N.E.2d 462 (1957).

